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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationships between the macro-political 
ideologies of a country and the process of the 
privatisation of state-owned companies have 
attracted considerable research interest in the recent 
literature (Robert and Warwick, 2015; Sharma and 
Lawrence, 2015; Noguchi et al., 2015). Focus has been 
on the relationships between privatisation and 
organisational performance (Chang, 2015), the role of 
consultants (Robert and Warwick, 2015), inter-
organisational power, and management control 
systems (Noguchi et al., 2015). There is a gap in the 
literature regarding re-privatisation of public sector 
organisations and micro-managerial strategies to 
improve organisational performance, especially in 
developing countries.  
The aim of this study is to fill this gap by 
analysing how macro political ideologies shape the 
implementation of cost management strategies at the 
organisational level, during re-privatisation of a 
public sector organisation co-owned by the Egyptian 
government. This study uses the institutional 
framework suggested by Dillard et al., 2004 as a 
conceptual starting point. The choice of the Dillard 
et al., 2004 framework is based on its robust 
conceptual tools which can be used to analyse multi-
level change processes in macro-political settings that 
affect organisational field practices, and micro 
organisational strategies aiming to achieve legitimacy 
at the societal level and secure organisational 
resources. The framework has been applied 
successfully in a recent study focussing on 
implementing international financial accounting 
policies at the field and organisational levels in 
western democracies (Guerreiro et al., 2015). A 
further application is needed to extend the 
framework to public sector organisations operating in 
countries dominated by military dictatorships, such 
as Egypt.  
Empirical data came from an ‘extended case 
study’ conducted in a state-owned enterprise, 
referred to as Meedco, from 2013 to 2014. Meedco 
holds a dominant position in the electricity and 
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energy market in Egypt. Data is based on semi-
structured interviews, field observations and 
documentary analysis and continuous interactions 
with key informants. Findings show that the political 
ideologies of Egyptian governments have had a 
negative impact on the managerial leadership and 
performance of Meedco over the years. As a result, 
governmental attempts to re-privatise Meedco failed. 
In this context, Meedco implemented cost 
management strategies to improve its performance. 
The implementation process did not attract 
international investors, however, because the state 
failed to convince them that their investments would 
be protected and evaluated at market-fair value. The 
findings contribute to the institutional framework 
suggested by Dillard et al. (2004) by showing the 
relevance of cost management strategies when used 
as a political tool to achieve a business goal, such as 
the organisational performance of a public sector 
organisation. 
The main practical implication, however, is to 
show the potential limitations of macro political 
power and the state’s policy of using management 
accounting strategies as a tool to achieve politically 
motivated business goals, as in the case of the re-
privatisation of Meedco. The next section critically 
reviews relevant management and accounting 
literature. It is followed by the theoretical framework 
used, research methods and context data, findings 
and discussion and the conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE: CHANGING MANAGERIAL REGIMES 
FROM COSTING TO COST MANAGEMENT 
 
At best, cost management practices were operational, 
not strategic, and were embedded within budgeting 
and standard costing systems. Cost management has 
been regarded as a useful operational tool for 
providing relevant information to managers to assist 
in decision-making processes, especially in terms of 
operational planning and control decisions (see 
Alsaid, 2017; Hoskin and Macve, 2000). However, with 
the emergence of Japan as an economic superpower, 
especially in discourses about total quality 
management (TQM), continuous improvement (CI) 
and just-in-time (JIT) production regimes, the 
traditional use of standard costing and budgeting 
practices were attacked as promoting inadequate and 
inefficient regimes of production and control (see 
Hoskin and Macve, 2000). For example, Morse et al. 
(1987) argued that the traditional labour, material 
and overhead cost standards incorporated a certain 
degree of leverage for waste, budgetary slack and 
other inefficiencies, resulting in a non-optimal (i.e., 
non-zero defect) production system. The traditional 
standard costing and budgetary systems conceive the 
attainment of zero defect quality levels non-optimal, 
that is, the zero defect quality level falls beyond the 
minimum total quality cost point (Johnson, 1994). 
Since these traditional cost standards were taken for 
granted as optimal, there was no focus on continuous 
improvement (Daniel and Reitsperger, 1992). It was 
only in the late 1980s that a managerial discourse 
emerged that highlighted the ‘strategic’ significance 
of cost management in terms of its centrality to TQM, 
as well as in relation to market positioning strategies 
(Porter and Miller, 1985). 
Recent developments in information 
technologies have had a particularly significant 
impact on the emergence of strategic cost 
management practices. Porter and Miller (1985, 
p. 156), for example, suggest that IT “has had a 
particularly strong impact on bargaining 
relationships between suppliers and buyers since it 
affects the linkages between companies and their 
suppliers, channels, and buyers. Information systems 
that cross company lines are becoming common”. In 
the context of the present case study, ERP is a recent 
technology adapted to help organisations manage 
their operational chains and associated costs. 
Innovative business software companies (SAP, or 
Oracle, for example) have developed flexible and 
multi-functional modular packages (Hyvonen, 2013), 
which initially focused on optimising internal 
business processes across the value-added chain. 
Currently, ERP vendors are also offering data 
warehousing and supply chain management software. 
Additionally, demand forecasting and supply chain 
optimisation applications can be integrated into 
standard ERP modules (such as finance, sales and 
distribution, human resources and manufacturing). 
Taken together, such software (as well as hardware 
developments such as superfast networking and 
mobile scanning devices that can connect to online 
database systems for transaction and activity 
tracking) has provided a much-needed technological 
infrastructure by which cost accounting can be 
translated into cost management (Hyvonen, 2013). 
Cost management has thus evolved into a 
strategically significant practice across organisations 
(see Alawattage et al., 2018; Alawattage and Alsaid, 
2018). As discussed earlier, costing has now moved 
beyond simply measuring and reporting product and 
service costs within a comprehensive managerial 
philosophy, attitude and set of techniques. Rather, it 
is a philosophy of improvement, continually 
promoting the need to find ways of creating increased 
customer value at the lowest possible cost. It has also 
been established as a proactive attitude – that costs 
result from management decisions: that is, costs do 
not just happen. Business partners – suppliers and 
customers – do not simply document decisions and 
record costs. They become active partners in making 
decisions to improve products and/or services and 
reduce costs. Cost management constitutes strategic 
techniques, such as ABC, ABM, BSC and ERP, which 
can be used individually to support a specific decision 
or collectively to support the organisation’s overall 
management. Cost management as an element of 
strategic management makes it not only research 
worthy but also raises the question of how the 
transformation of managerial regimes from costing 
to cost management and then to strategic cost 
management, has been theorised in academic circles 
(Hopper et al., 2009; Alawattage and Alsaid, 2018). 
 
3. THEORY: INSTITUTIONALISM, ACCOUNTING, 
AND POLITICS 
 
Dillard et al. (2004) drew inspiration for their 
research from a new institutional theory (DiMaggio 
and Power, 1983, 1991), the theory of axes of tension 
suggested by Weber (1968), and some elements of 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984). 
New institutional theory analyses how organisations 
respond to macro-environmental pressure by 
implementing change policies at the organisational 
level in order to secure organisational resources and 
societal acceptance, that is, legitimacy. Structuration 
theory analyses relationships between organisational 
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structures and actions of organisational actors, that 
is, agency. Weber’s theory on axes of tension uses 
concepts of representation, rationality and power to 
explain potential tensions that take place at different 
organisational levels during the implementation of a 
change policy.  
Dillard et al. (2004) argue that organisational 
change is political. The power of organised interests 
shape the multi-level process of institutionalisation 
that starts at the social environmental level and 
continues to the organisational field level before it is 
institutionalised at the organisational level. The social 
environmental level is a field of macro political 
economic policies. This operates by establishing 
norms or criteria that become implemented at the 
societal level and in organisational ﬁelds. The 
organisational ﬁeld includes industry groups and 
professional trade associations. For example, a 
national Parliament has the power and authority to 
set labour laws that establish legitimate practices in 
labour relationships at organisational field level and 
in organisations. This means, that norms, criteria, and 
practices established at the macro political level 
become translated at organisational field level into 
legitimacy criteria to evaluate whether actions that 
take place in the organisational ﬁeld are legitimate 
(Chang, 2015). These legitimacy criteria established at 
organisational field level are translated into operating 
practices to provide the legitimating and regulating 
bases for action at the organisational level (Dillard 
et al., 2004; Guerreiro et al., 2015).  
Each organisation adopts different strategies, 
ranging from early innovators to late adopters, to 
secure organisational resources and legitimacy in the 
organisational field and societal levels. Innovators are 
early adopters of norms and practices that are 
regarded as legitimate at organisational field level 
(Bol and Moers, 2010). Later adopters, by contrast, are 
those organisations that adopt practices and norms 
that have already become institutionalised by 
innovators (Bol and Moers, 2010). The adoption can 
be substantial or ceremonial, depending on whether 
the organisation is under high-level pressure to 
emulate the operations of other organisations in the 
same industry or intend to become regarded as a 
leading organisation in the industry (Ezzamel and 
Burns, 2005). Innovative practices can move 
horizontally or vertically. They can modify legitimate 
practices and criteria in the organisational ﬁeld by 
reinforcing, revising, or eliminating them. New 
organisational practices, when perceived as being in 
line with ‘better practice’, become adopted by other 
organisations within the same organisational ﬁeld, 
that is, they become institutionalised at 
organisational field level (Ezzamel and Burns, 2005). 
New practices at the organisational ﬁeld level, 
however, have the potential to inﬂuence the broader 
macro political and economic environment. Hence, 
they affect symbolic sense-making criteria at the 
societal level by reinforcing, modifying, or 
eliminating existing norms and practices established 
at, amongst others, the economic and political levels 
(Dillard et al., 2004; Chapman et al., 2014; Agrizzia 
and Sian, 2015). 
Hopper and Major (2007) have extended the 
Dillard et al., 2004 conceptual framework by using a 
different approach to analyse the diffusion of 
innovation processes at the organisational level. They 
replaced the two extreme alternatives suggested by 
Dillard et al., 2004, that is, early innovators versus 
late adopters, by a process through which 
organisational ﬁeld practices become translated into 
working practices before their implementation in 
each organisation. The translation process is based 
on the assumption that ideas and practices are 
interpreted and reformulated during the process of 
adoption (Greenwood et al., 2008; Robert and 
Warwick, 2015). Accordingly, if organisational actors 
experience institutional contradictions, such as 
inconsistencies with established social arrangements, 
the consciousness of actors is reshaped and 
resistance against imposed institutionalised practices 
should be expected. Hopper and Major’s (2007) 
conceptualisation is based on Seo and Creed’s (2002) 
four sources of institutional contradiction: (1) 
legitimacy demands and functional efﬁciency; (2) 
imperatives to adapt to external environments, 
existing identities and routines; (3) interconnected 
institutional arrangements; and (4) actors’ interests. 
Because these sources of contradiction affect the 
collective consciousness of actors and their praxis, 
they provide alternative logics of actions that take 
place during the process of institutional change at the 
organisational level (Hopper and Mayer, 2007). 
Critical studies have analysed relationships 
between the implementation of macro political policy 
change, such as privatisation, and accounting 
practices at organisational levels (Sharma and 
Lawrence, 2015). For example, Skærbæk and 
Melander (2004) have analysed the role of accounting 
during an organisational change process to privatise 
a Danish owned Ferry company. Their study shows 
that accounting plays different facilitating roles 
depending on the strategic steps involved in the 
privatisation process. Cragg and Dyck (1999) have 
analysed the relationships between the ownership 
structure and internal control practices of state-
owned firms when they start to trade publically in the 
UK. Their study shows that state-owned firms change 
their internal control practices when they start to 
trade in the UK stock market. Uddin and Hopper 
(2001) analysed the effect of full privatisation on the 
management accounting and control systems of a 
soap manufacturing company in Bangladesh. Their 
study shows that the senior management team 
started to use budgets as devices to monitor 
organisational performance after privatisation. 
Moreover, the company institutionalised a new 
computer-based accounting system to speed up the 
delivery of financial information to key decision 
makers.  
In another study, Uddin and Hopper (2003) used 
data from the World Bank to compare the accounting 
and financial performance practices in the 
Bangladesh company and other privatised companies 
in Bangladesh. Their results revealed that all 
companies analysed had changed their accounting 
and financial management systems to comply with 
the legal requirements applicable to privatised 
companies. Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) have 
examined changes to budgetary control and 
performance monitoring in World Bank-sponsored 
public sector reforms in Ghana. Their findings show 
that budgetary practices did not change substantially. 
However, budgetary reporting did change. The 
budgetary process continued to be a political forum, 
directionless and ineffective. As a result, budgetary 
reporting to the monitoring agency did not make any 
positive changes to accountability and organisational 
performance.  
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Sharma and Lawrence (2015), reached similar 
findings when analysing the process of privatisation 
of a state-owned Telecom Company in Fuji. Xu and 
Uddin (2008) have examined public sector reforms 
with special reference to privatisation and its political 
impact on changing regimes of management control 
in a Chinese state-owned enterprise. The rationale for 
privatisation in China is that public sector 
organisations that become privatised have to control 
costs and improve their performance, which will 
improve economic growth and employment. The 
findings of this study show, however, that 
privatisation failed to achieve expected outcomes in 
the organisations analysed. Ezzamel and Burns 
(2005), have analysed power relations between 
organisational actors in a struggle over a 
management control strategy during the 
implementation of a new performance measurement 
system – Economic Value Added (EVA) – in a large UK 
company. This company designed EVA to replace the 
previous performance measurement system, which 
focused on profit margins, and which had been 
suspended after six months’ use. The main reason for 
this suspension was that conflict had arisen between 
the company accountants and the management team. 
However, EVA did not become a component of the 
day-to-day information used in different 
organisational levels. There was no matching or 
harmony between the new rules that emerged with 
EVA and existing institutions or the taken-for-granted 
assumptions the new rules were grounded in. In 
contrast, Nagushi et al. (2015) found a positive 
relationship between military leadership and the 
operational management of the Mitsubishi 
Corporation during the implementation of the new 
management accounting and control systems in 
Mitsubishi after the Second World War.  
Our operationalisation of the theoretical 
framework of this study follows three steps: First, the 
study analyses the political ideologies through which 
the case study organisation became nationalised and 
its re-privatisation failures. Second, the study 
analyses managerial strategies that prevailed at 
organisational field level after the re-privatisation 
process. Third, the study analyses managerial 
strategies used to improve cost-management and 
performance of the case organisation.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1. Extended case study 
 
Burawoy (2009) has suggested using extended case 
study methodology when conducting a qualitative 
study intended to contribute to theory. One 
requirement is to collect data that shows macro 
political settings in which micro organisational 
change policies are implemented. Another 
requirement is to combine different types of data, 
such as, document analysis, interviews and meeting 
observation in order to analyse how organisational 
members react to micro organisational change 
policies and the role of accounting tools in 
implementing the change (Ahrens and Chapman, 
2005). 
The study used the Dillard et al.’s (2004) 
framework as a dynamic, (as opposed to static) 
structure to design the research work and collect the 
data. The framework provided the tools to analyse 
historical and institutional dynamics that have taken 
place at the macro political level and in the case study 
organisation. Data collection was based on two 
perspectives. The first perspective focuses on market 
and industry conditions that make cost management 
one of the fundamental strategic tools to implement 
national political ideologies in organisational fields 
and organisations when structural competitive 
contexts change. The second perspective focuses on 
internal re-configuration of organisational structures, 
processes and practices through which a package of 
strategic cost management practices becomes 
institutionalised. The macro data, that is the data 
implementing the first perspective, was gathered by 
document analysis including official financial 
reports, articles in periodical magazines, local 
newspapers, academic journal articles, and 
information on the websites of the organisations 
analysed. The micro data was collected through 
interviews with key organisational actors, such as 
accountants, operational managers and IT staff in 
addition to the document analysis and meeting 
observations. 
Data collection took place in a government-
owned company known as Meedco (Middle Egypt 
Electricity Distribution Company). Meedco is one of 
the biggest electricity and energy distribution 
companies in Egypt; it has 13 branches in different 
regions. Its market share exceeds 56 per cent of the 
national market; its annual profits have increased to 
1.7 billion Egyptian Pounds (approximately £1.5 
million). It has 8,718 employees including engineers, 
technicians and administrative staff. The choice of 
Meedco was based on three reasons. First, it is 
illustrative of the macroeconomic transitions and 
political ideologies of Egypt that have moved from a 
centrally planned economy to a free market economy. 
Second, it was believed that Meedco had the potential 
to provide appropriate data for the case study. Third, 
the leadership of Meedco and the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilisation and Statistics in Egypt provided 
formal permission to collect the data (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006).  
The case company was dependent 
technologically and in terms of the market on foreign 
capital. Philips, as it was then, was a leading 
international company in the electricity industry, 
based in Britain; it established its branch in Egypt 
under the name of ‘Philips-Orient’ in 1940. Its main 
activity was distributing hydro-electricity, which was 
launched for the first time in 1944 in light of the 
political practices of the colonial state. After 
nationalisation law no. 118 (1961) was passed, Philips 
became a 50 per cent public sector company, trading 
under the name of Middle Egypt Electricity 
Distribution Company (Meedco). Its electrical 
products and services continued to carry the brand 
name ‘Philips’ until the public sector crisis and its 
successive losses, which by the end of the 1980s had 
swept away state-owned enterprises. By the early 
1990s further political change led to a number of re-
privatisation initiatives by the company (Meedco, 
2013). 
 
4.2. Data collection 
 
Data collection started in November 2013 and ended 
in February 2014. The case company was visited nine 
times during a planned period for the main data 
collection phase from 15th November 2013 to 15th 
February 2014. The interval between each visit ranged 
from 7 to 10 days. Between 4–5 interviews were 
conducted during each visit and the working day was 
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spent within different operating departments. The 
research was conducted from the beginning of the 
working day for employees (from around 8 a.m.) until 
they finished their operational routines at 3 p.m. In 
all, 42 formal interviews were conducted with 28 
different people, namely, 16 accountants, 7 
operational managers and 5 IT staff. Their practical 
experience in the management and accounting fields 
ranged from 5 to 25 years. Interviews were tape 
recorded and transcribed whenever possible. They 
were conducted in either Arabic or English; the choice 
being left to the respondents. They ranged from thirty 
minutes to two hours depending on work 
circumstances and the time available with each 
interviewee. Most interviews, however, lasted for 
around one hour. At the end of each interview we 
were given contact details for interviewee(s) so that 
s/he might be recalled later in the data analysis 
phase: this was to facilitate a fuller understanding of 
anything that remained vague and to enable a follow-
up to anything new that might have occurred in their 
operational cost management practices.  
The finance manager (FM) provided us with an 
office (next to his office room) during our stay at the 
company. We joined the FM and his staff during their 
lunch breaks, in the course of which numerous work-
related discussions were observed. We were able to 
move freely inside the company, thereby gaining 
access to the on-site library and other information 
sites. This contributed greatly to knowledge of the 
company and to a sense of what was going on in 
general terms. Two joint meetings were conducted 
with the marketing manager, the FM, the head of the 
cost management department and the IT manager. In 
addition, eight meetings involving key decision 
makers in the organisation were directly observed. 
The meetings were not tape recorded. However, the 
taking of notes was permitted. Observation of 
meetings contributed to a further understanding of 
the role of management accounting information in 
organisational decision making. 
 
5. ANALYSIS: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES  
 
5.1. Political ideologies and managerial structure of 
Meedco 
 
A national revolution took place in 1952 in Egypt. Its 
immediate outcome was the end of colonisation and 
the beginning of a military dictatorship. The military 
regime decided to nationalise business 
multinationals operating in Egypt. One of the key 
political aims at that time was the gradual 
transformation of the colonial capitalist regime to a 
nationalised socialist regime. The intention of the 
new regime was to benefit from foreign expertise in 
the management of multinational companies 
operating in Egypt. As a result, a new law on 
nationalisation came into force in 1960.  
“…The postcolonial regime tried to show 
changes in state governance by opposing the 
commercial interests of the West in the Middle East 
and by adopting aggressive politics against foreign 
companies in Egypt” (Farah, 2009, p. 54). 
The original name of Meedco was Philips 
Oriental. Philips Oriental was a branch of Philips Ltd., 
a UK based multinational specialising in electricity 
and energy markets. Philips Ltd established Philips 
Oriental in 1944 in Egypt. The 1960 law transferred 
fifty per cent of Philips Oriental’s shares to the 
Egyptian government. Philips Oriental kept the 
remaining fifty per cent of shares. The brand name of 
Philips Oriental ceased to exist in Egypt and was 
replaced by the brand name Meedco. Elites from the 
military regime took over Meedco’s senior 
management positions. Products and services of 
Philips Ltd, however, continued to carry the brand 
name ‘Philips’ until the political crisis in the late 
1980s.  
The 1980s crisis swept away state-owned 
enterprises and ended nationalisation policies. 
“…The historical development of macro 
economy and politics in Egypt has demonstrated that 
inter-elite power conflict has been and still is the 
prime factor in the quest for political change. In many 
instances, the power struggle between Egyptian elites 
and foreign elites has forced Egyptian elites to form 
alliances with other classes in society, especially the 
middle class, in order to protect their own interests 
and to dislodge the power of foreign elites” (Farah, 
2009, p. 55). 
From a critical approach, however, the 1960s-
1970s nationalisation was a partial failure because 
the government could not fully nationalise foreign 
multinationals, such as Philips Ltd. Meedco relied on 
foreign capital both financially and intellectually to 
be able to operate competitively.  
In the early 1990s, the Egyptian government 
tried to re-privatise Meedco by selling its shares back 
to Phillips Ltd. The re-privatisation process failed, 
however, because Philips Ltd did not trust the 
profitability estimations suggested by the 
government. As a result, the government transferred 
the senior management of Meedco to the Egyptian 
Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Electricity and Energy 
in 1991. The government shares were also transferred 
to the EEHC (Meedco, 1998). Transferring Meedco to 
the ministry of electricity and energy gave rise to 
managerial tensions between the ministry and Philips 
Ltd. The tensions resulted from disagreements 
concerning setting the company’s business priorities. 
There was a mismatch between the wider political-
military objectives of the state and narrower financial 
objectives of the company.  
The government attempted to resolve this 
problem by trying to resell its shares in Meedco to its 
foreign co-owner i.e., Philips Ltd in 1997. Negotiations 
failed, however, because Meedco had experienced 
successive losses since the early 1990s. Philips Ltd 
evaluated the value of its shares as equivalent to 60% 
of the total value of the company. Government 
officials estimated the value of its shares in Meedco 
as equivalent to 50% of the total value of the 
company.  
The political struggle over the re-privatisation of 
Meedco was a consequence of the increasing need by 
the government to attract and entertain foreign direct 
investors. To become more attractive, Meedco 
initiated substantial reforms in its performance 
management system, including ERP (Enterprise 
Resource Planning) to improve profitability. However, 
because of increasing political tension between 
Philips Ltd and the government, the weakness of 
investment potentials in Meedco, and the lack of a 
legal framework to protect foreign investors, Philips 
Ltd decided to withdraw all its investments from 
Egypt in 1998. 
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This finding shows the relationship between 
political ideologies of the state and inter-
organisational management practices between the 
state and co-owners of a state-owned company, such 
as Meedco. Egypt became nationalist and militarised 
on the political front in 1952. Nationalisation became 
a macroeconomic tool (Zohny, 1988). The result was 
the integration of political and economic apparatuses 
into a single structure of governance 
(Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Cragg and Dyck, 
1999). There was a massive nationalisation 
programme and ‘communism’ was a popular political 
ideology in Egypt (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; 
Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). However, one 
of the key differences between this global trend 
elsewhere and in the Egyptian State, as in some other 
Islamic countries, was that Egypt was both 
nationalistic and militarised. 
In this setting, the historical evolution of 
managing public sector organisations in Egypt needs 
to be understood in the context of Egyptian macro-
political dynamics. In accordance with Dillard et al. 
(2004), it is paramount to include macro political 
criteria in analysing micro organisational change 
policies. Distinct fields, such as the electricity and 
energy market in which Meedco operates, are 
constructed through the political logic of the state.  
The findings of this study show that electricity 
and energy production and distribution in Egypt have 
been managed at three distinct but interrelated levels 
since the 1950’s revolution: the political level, the 
field level and the organisational level. Neoliberal 
political reforms – privatisation and re-privatisation – 
have penetrated all these levels to transform 
performance management practices, in effect 
institutionalising a neoliberal regime in which 
performance management has become not only a 
strategic imperative in a managerial sense but also a 
political imperative in terms of state politics (Hopper 
and Major, 2007). While privatisation instigated the 
changes required in political ideologies and 
ownership structures, in order to establish the 
political and institutional infrastructure for 
neoliberal transformation, re-privatisation brought 
about the accounting technologies, such as ERP, that 
enabled such ideological and structural 
transformation at the micro level. Thus, micro-level 
changes in performance management practices 
became a political as well as a managerial imperative 
(Naguchi et al., 2015). 
 
5.2. Managerial efforts to improve the 
competitiveness of Meedco  
 
To improvement competitiveness, Meedco’s senior 
management decided to divide its Egyptian market 
into two geographical regions: the northern and 
southern regions. Each region has different sub-
markets. Both regions are integrated into a Central 
Operating Area (COA) established in 2005. The role of 
COA is to monitor the financial performance of each 
region regularly. The COA provides a quarterly 
performance evaluation report, known as ‘cost 
report’, to the Ministry of Electricity and Energy. 
Since the 1990s, Meedco started to expand its 
market activity in response to macro-political 
pressure from the Commission of the European 
Union and the government of Egypt to modernise 
public-sector organisations operating in the business 
sector and to privatise them. During this process, 
Meedco started to import and sell electronics, such as 
televisions, refrigerators and electric light bulbs. In 
1999, Meedco decided to prioritise the manufacturing 
of light bulbs. This was maintained in addition to 
distributing electricity. Meedco was the first company 
to sell ‘energy saving bulbs’ in Egypt and to export 
them to Arab markets through a large factory in the 
Middle East. Currently, Meedco operates three 
production factories: a glass factory, a general 
lighting and special electric light bulb factory, and a 
fluorescent tube factory (Meedco, 2013). 
The adoption of new operating strategies has 
been at the forefront of attempts to make the 
company more attractive to private investment. 
Meedco faces intense competition from other 
electricity production and distribution companies. 
For example, the Deputy Board Director indicated 
that each manager tries hard to sell his products at 
the lowest possible price in order to attract the largest 
number of customers. In 2005, the senior 
management team had to adopt a new pricing policy 
which classified sale prices into three levels: high, 
medium and low. Each price level targets a specific 
customer segment and applies to specific technical 
aspects of electricity distribution.  
In the early 2000s, Meedco decided to sell the 
first two levels of its electricity services at a 
breakeven price, in order to attract new customers 
and increase its market share. The Deputy Board 
Director explained: “…We have actually succeeded in 
that and the company now holds about 57 per cent of 
customers in the Egyptian electricity market, 
especially with respect to the sale indicators of the 
first level”. 
Document analysis indicates that Meedco made 
a profit by selling the third level electricity services to 
its loyal (and wealthy) customers. The profit 
compensated for losses from the sales of other 
electricity services at cheaper prices and improved 
total profitability in the company. The financial 
manager commented: “The reason that pushed senior 
management to adopt a new pricing policy and re-
classify electricity sale levels is intense competition… 
among electricity distribution companies… There was 
also a desire to increase the number of customers and 
acquire a competitive advantage in the market”. 
When Meedco succeeded in becoming a market-
oriented company, it expanded industrial activities, 
established new production factories and advanced 
distribution stations in order to maximise profits, 
compensate for previous losses, and cope with the 
EU-Egypt requirements of economic reform in public 
sector organisations operating in Egypt. 
This finding suggests that successful micro 
organisational change in Meedco was a result of 
positive inter-organisational relations between 
politicians at the macro level, field actors and 
organisational actors within Meedco. The macro-
political relations concern wider political structural 
changes at the state level and between the state and 
the EU (Dillard et al., 2004). They have been 
instrumental in implementing micro-managerial 
changes to improve Meedco’s competitiveness. 
Another success factor was the positive internal and 
external power relations in Meedco (Dillard et al., 
2004). External power has been imposed by political 
actors, that is, the government, and field actors, that 
is, the EEHC, in the form of laws, decrees and 
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regulations. Internal power has been imposed by the 
board director, as regards the single procedural 
protocol of improving performance management 
strategies. 
In conformity with previous literature 
(e.g., Graetz et al., 2002; Josiah et al., 2010; Yang and 
Model, 2013) the power of international regulators – 
in this case, the EU – influences the application of new 
accounting and strategic management regimes. As a 
result, Meedco played a strategic role for the state 
when implementing modern management accounting 
and control system, such as the ERP, to comply with 
expectations of the EU and the Egyptian ruling power. 
The formal power that Meedco adopted was coercive 
and legitimate. The use of macro coercive power, 
however, was accompanied by a micro organisational 
‘participative’ role provided by the company itself. 
This finding contributes to previous studies showing 
intra-organisational resistance against macro-
organisational changes in public sector organisations 
because of conflicts between interests of 
organisational members and new political rules of the 
state (Guerreiro et al., 2015; Agrizzia and Sian, 2015; 
Chang, 2015; Robert and Warwick, 2015; Sharma and 
Lawrence, 2015; Noguchi et al., 2015). 
Our findings show that the use of power by a 
government body or by central government can assist 
in the introduction of new performance management 
regimes when the coercive power has a participative 
role. The role of power is evident in this instance from 
its influence on public entities during strategic 
political reforms over the last decade: privatisation 
and re-privatisation. This is in agreement with Dillard 
et al. (2004) in that the impact of some forms of 
power, such as leadership power, can contribute 
significantly to the success of performance 
management reforms. 
 
5.3. The role of ERP in signifying cost management 
 
Meedco’s implementation of a new ERP system, as one 
of the modernisation initiatives, has signified cost 
management at the organisational unit and inter-
organisational levels. ERP has helped the company to 
improve their cost calculations, cost allocations and 
cost measurements, via a refined system of cost 
coding, identification and comparisons. The day-to-
day operating routines, however, vary from one 
department to another depending on the 
responsibilities of each unit within the company. A 
senior cost accountant indicated, for example, that 
the sequence of daily work for the General Accounts 
and Budget Department varies from the procedural 
steps taken in the Cost Department. Tasks of cost 
managers vary from department to department. In 
addition, we observed that the ERP portal varies from 
department to department as well, depending on the 
identity and authority of each manager, and the level 
of power framed within the department. The 
configuration of ERP is based on what is called ‘users 
power’ in Meedco. That is, each actor has specific 
authorities and, accordingly, specific portal 
configuration. 
For example, in the cost department, day-to-day 
operating routines for each accounting actor begin by 
them logging on to the system through an 
individually assigned username and password. Daily 
cost control practices are concentrated in two main 
menus within the ERP portal: Inquiry and Reports. As 
the cost department chief manager indicates, the 
Inquiry Menu is the basic menu for daily cost 
activities: it includes features that address cost 
accountants’ daily tasks; the Reports Menu includes 
functions that deal with periodic cost reports. Other 
operational ERP menus cover the technical settings 
for the system itself. The basic ‘Inquiry’ menu 
includes five functions to deal with day-to-day (or 
periodic) cost activities. Some of the cost accountants 
observed that the first feature deals with ‘inquiries’ 
about journal entries and balances of accounts. The 
second addresses the ‘analysis’ of cost centres, the 
cost movements against activities and accounting 
units, the analysis of activities on cost centres and the 
analysis of cost centres on activities. The third 
function deals with ‘inquiries’ about the total cost 
movement against activities and the balances for cost 
centres. The fourth function presents ‘graphically’ the 
balances of accounts, the movement within cost 
centres and the balances against activities. The fifth 
function provides access to the SQL tools, that is, the 
standard language for accessing databases and 
further inquiries. Each function has a specific 
template through which the cost managers can carry 
out their operational cost calculations, allocations 
and measurement routines. 
The secondary ‘Reports’ menu, as explained by 
some of the cost accountants, has basic 
functionalities that they use monthly. They provide 
four main managerial accounting reports: the account 
statement, the trial balance, journal entry audits and 
total accounts movement. Each has a specific 
template that the cost accountants use to prepare 
monthly cost reports. The aim of each report is to 
analyse cost management in the accounts of each cost 
centre. When a cost accountant ‘clicks’ on a template, 
the template appears on the screen. The template 
includes a variety of blanks that the cost accountant 
fills in to complete the required reporting process, 
including type of account (functional or qualitative), 
the period of time over which the process has been 
carried out (from–to), the way of displaying cost 
centres (columns or rows), journals (from–to), activity 
(from–to), units (from–to) and total costs. 
Implementing ERP has institutionalised the use 
of cost journals. The template includes three basic 
journals that the cost accountants use regularly: the 
balances journal, the documents journal and the 
adjustments journal. A senior cost accountant 
indicated that cost accountants use the cost journals 
each month when they receive the trial balances of 
geographically distributed operating branches and 
regions for auditing and balancing against the 
company’s central balances. The records are 
classified into two geographical regions: Northern 
and Southern. The cost accountants receive these by 
email. Before the implementation of ERP, employees 
of different branches and regions travelled to the 
head office of Meedco to deliver the cost reports there 
personally. After successful implementation of ERP, 
they started sending their trial balances electronically 
via email. After receiving the trial balances, the cost 
accountants begin loading them into the central 
balances journal. When that is done, the accountants 
begin to reconcile monthly cost balances in the 
company’s books for each region. Sometimes they 
find differences between them. In such cases, the cost 
accountants send an email to the relevant branch or 
region to audit these differences. They then record 
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and describe the adjustments in the central balances 
journal of the branch or region that had to have cost 
accounting differences. 
ERP has introduced the documents journal that 
shows daily cost processes at the company’s head 
office. It includes a specific form on which the cost 
accountants record and describe day-to-day cost 
transactions occurring at the company’s head office 
in the form of ‘journal entries’. A cost accountant 
explained: “The daily disbursement documents are 
first moved from the Inventory Department to the 
General Accounts Department and then to the Cost 
Accounts. The cost accountant prepares the monthly 
trial balance regarding cost processes at 
headquarters and balances with the General Accounts 
Department and the Inventory Department in order 
to ensure the correctness of the cost balances”. 
As a result, cost accountants can obtain the 
disbursement documents through the ERP database 
directly. A senior accountant commented: “I can 
obtain the disbursement documents for each project 
separately. When recording the code of a project, the 
system shows the disbursement documents through 
which I can determine the disbursed supplies for each 
project. As the inventory accountants upload their 
documents into the system, I can see them 
automatically on my own screen”. 
Through the documents journal, ERP has 
institutionalised two key items: cost centres and cost 
accounts. The cost centres are shown horizontally 
while the cost accounts are shown vertically. The 
senior cost accountant explained that the cost centres 
are classified in the documents journal into five 
centres: the management team, the training centre, 
the control centre, the printing centre and the 
invoicing centre. A senior cost accountant explained: 
“In the old computerised system, the documents 
journal included three cost centres only: 
management, the control centre and the invoicing 
centre… The training centre and the printing centre 
were separate cost centres for the system. They had 
special books, which were prepared manually…” 
The implementation of advanced operating 
functionalities, as in the Oracle ERP programme, has 
enabled the IT department to add the training and 
printing cost centres into the documents journal. A 
senior accountant commented: “This upgrade has 
enabled cost accountants to re-code all cost centres. 
The current codes of cost centres… are as follows: the 
firm management centre 01, the training centre 02, 
the control centre 03, the printing centre 04, and the 
invoicing centre 05. The ‘zero’ numbers indicate the 
code of the region in which the firm is located”. 
Another change of cost management routines in 
Meedco focuses on ‘costs movement’ as opposed to 
focusing on each cost separately. The accountants 
and managers have acquired routines to analyse and 
understand costs based on ‘movement’. During our 
case study, managers used the word ‘movement’ to 
explain the impact of analysing costs through the 
integrated supply chain of Meedco’s products and 
services. It is this movement in costs that has become 
the driving force of all operational and strategic 
actions within Meedco. It has become the basic 
calculative logic through which organisational 
performance is understood. The purpose of cost 
reports has been re-defined to focus on managing 
total costs rather than reporting costs for auditing 
purposes. The chief manager of cost departments 
explained: “…One of the most important roles that 
the cost department plays is to control the daily cost 
movements in different operational departments. 
Each chief of the cost sub-departments (e.g., 
inventory cost department chief, purchase cost 
department chief, indirect cost centres department 
chief, production cost centres chief) is responsible for 
controlling daily operating and cost movement”. 
This kind of role is not confined to the level of 
senior cost accountants (i.e., chiefs of cost sub-
departments) but includes each of the cost 
department chiefs, the finance manager and the 
board director. The cost department chief explained 
that one of his tasks is the daily monitoring of the 
entire movement of the costs through operational 
and financial numbers recorded into the ERP system. 
The daily operating report is then uploaded, which 
covers the cost movements that have taken place 
within the company. The daily operating report is 
sent to the finance manager automatically. The 
finance manager commented: “…Every day I enter 
into the system and print this report… I check it and 
keep it in the ‘daily movement file’. If I discover any 
significant difference from the budget, I contact the 
cost department chief and the chiefs of relevant 
operational departments in order to inquire whether 
these differences are ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ for the 
firm and to require a detailed report for the 
variances…” 
These cost reports have been instrumental in 
changing managerial actions and behaviour in 
Meedco. The Deputy Board Director states that the 
Board Director controls cost movements through 
these daily cost reports. The reports guide the senior 
management team’s behaviours and strategies, which 
are adapted for cost minimisation and profit 
maximisation. Through them, the relevant employees 
can determine cost and price increases or decreases 
compared to previous periods, considering economic 
circumstances and other political considerations 
surrounding the field.  
For example, the 2012 cost report revealed 
increases in costs compared to the previous periods. 
The EEHC required a detailed report about the 
reasons for these increases. The company established 
a committee (including the board director, the FM, the 
cost department chief and chiefs of other operational 
departments) to discuss the reasons for these 
increases during that period. The committee reported 
that there had been changes following the revolution 
of 25th January 2011 and that they had had an impact 
in terms of the following increased costs: (1) 
increased import costs for the high-quality cables 
that are installed in streets; (2) increased electricity 
supply costs from power stations; and (3) increased 
transportation costs to get company equipment to 
specific sites.  
After receiving the report of the cost variance 
enquiry, the EEHC decided to change operational 
strategies of Meedco. The strategic change decisions 
included: (1) purchasing cables from the domestic 
market rather than importing them, while retaining a 
satisfactory level of electricity provision to 
customers; (2) increasing electricity sale prices in 
accordance with increases in purchase costs from 
power stations; and (3) subcontracting one of the 
transportation companies (the Hope company), which 
offered lower costs for five years. 
This finding of our case study is consistent with 
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the conceptualisation of internal organisational 
dynamics that shape the implementation of new 
organisational practices (Hopper and Major, 2007). 
Such conceptualisation, based on the concept of 
translation, is particularly useful in the context of 
adopting ERP as compulsory practice in Meedco. 
Positive relations between the military leadership at 
Meedco, political field actors at EEHC and 
organisational executives created operational power 
towards the change.  
The culture was another powerful device that 
played a significant role in Meedco during the process 
of cost management change (Dillard et al., 2004). 
Being a former branch of Philips Ltd, Meedco had 
experience in performance and cost management at 
the organisational level before the implementation of 
the ERP. This previous experience and accounting 
culture played a supportive role in facilitating the 
costing change and implementation of new cost 
management regime. The particular culture of 
Meedco’s leadership that is close to Egyptian military 
culture supported the accounting change. The 
cultural background of Meedco and its sub-
departments helped the organisation to act in line 
with the political reforms that occurred at the levels 
of the state and the economy – such as privatisation 
and re-privatisation. 
From a critical approach, the military culture of 
the board director has caused a ‘culture of fear’ and 
operational tension. The board director likes to 
regulate and manage ‘everything’. The executive 
managers are unable to make even the simple 
decisions, without referring to the board director who 
created a culture of fear amongst the employees. This 
is causing enormous tension within various operating 
sectors on ERP-based cost management practices. As 
observed: 
  Meedco has accepted the change imposed by 
its political management and the field actors for 
legitimation and the need to secure financial support 
from the EEHC, especially after the failure of its re-
privatisation and the subsequent negative effects on 
its trade name in the electricity market. However, 
internal conflicts were observed between the finance 
department and other operational departments due 
to the fact that the ERP technologies have not been 
fully implemented in the whole company. 
  The operational tension between the finance 
department and the board director was due to the 
fact that the board director has not been persuaded 
of the importance of encouraging employees to 
implement the ERP by using employee promotion 
schemes and a financial bonus paid every three 
months. At the beginning of ERP implementation, 
senior management rewarded the employees who 
participated in putting the data into the system 
through a financial bonus paid every three months. 
But after the installation of the system and it became 
the fundamental part of day-to-day routines for 
employees, the board director stopped this bonus for 
several reasons. Firstly, it only included departments 
operating through ERP. Secondly, the improper 
inclusion of some employees from departments not 
implementing ERP on these bonuses sheets. Thirdly, 
because of the nature of some employees’ work in the 
firm, e.g., inventory personnel, they were not required 
to use the system. Those employees were unfairly 
deprived of these bonuses. 
  The board director was not convinced of the 
importance of putting other departments into the ERP 
programme although they shape the ‘heart’ of the 
company. They embrace a lot of day-to-day and 
periodic operating activities and processes. This 
caused huge operating problems between these 
departments and departments operating through 
ERP, especially the finance department. 
  Senior management did not impose its 
authority on managers to fully implement ERP. The 
senior managers asked the IT manager to persuade 
employees of the importance of these programmes 
for the firm. In turn, the IT manager spoke to the 
employees once or twice. Employees that were 
persuaded to implement ERP started to do it while 
others argued to the contrary. The IT manager could 
not impose his opinion on other managers in the 
company. As explained before, such a matter needs a 
decision of the board director. 
Our findings are consistent with Dillard et al.’s 
(2004) argument that a new organisational culture – 
in this case, the military culture – is the main 
foundation of leadership power – here, the power of 
the board director. Wickramasinghe and Hopper 
(2005), for example, explore how management 
accounting rules and routines support the change 
process by providing the power to define the norms 
and standards that shape organisational behaviour. It 
also has the power to demarcate suitable forms of 
structure and policy that run unquestioned over time. 
A significant element of this process is located in 
meanings and values (Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2008). This is consistent with 
Dillard et al. (2004), who argue that the encoding 
process draws on the taken-for-granted assumptions, 
which comprise the institutional principles, through 
their instantiation in existing meanings, values, and 
power. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this study was to analyse how macro 
political ideologies shape the implementation of cost 
management strategies at an organisational level 
during re-privatisation a public sector organisation 
co-owned by the Egyptian government. The study 
used the institutional theoretical framework 
suggested by Dillard et al. (2004) as a conceptual 
starting point to conduct an extended case study in a 
state-owned enterprise, referred to as Meedco, from 
2013 to 2014. Meedco has held a dominant position 
in the electricity and energy market of Egypt since the 
1950s national revolution. Data was based on semi-
structured interviews, field observations, document 
analysis and continuous interactions with key 
informants.  
Findings show that the political ideologies of the 
Egyptian governments have had a negative impact on 
managerial leadership and the performance of 
Meedco over the years. For example, senior 
management of Meedco is dominated by military 
elites who have used the military power of the ruling 
political regime to implement macro political policy 
change in Meedco. Meedco became semi-nationalised 
in the 1950s until the political revolution in the late 
1980s that ended nationalisation and started 
privatising public sector organisations in Egypt. The 
government’s attempt to privatise Meedco in the early 
1990s failed, however, because Meedco had suffered 
record financial losses over the years and its expected 
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future profitability was not reliable. Failure to 
privatise Meedco led to the transference of the 
ownership and supervision of Meedco to the Egyptian 
Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) under the control 
of the Ministry of Electricity and Energy in 1991.  
In practice, this structural change meant that 
Meedco became a minefield of political power, and 
managerial tensions arose in the setting of priorities 
over the operative strategies of Meedco. The 
increasingly aggressive policies of the state against 
foreign direct investment in Egypt in the 1990s, the 
decreasing profitability of Meedco and a lack of 
mechanisms to evaluate Meedco’s assets at a fair 
market value led to the second failure to re-privatise 
Meedco and complete the withdrawal of Philips Ltd. 
as co-owner of Meedco, from the Egyptian market in 
the late 1990s. In setting priorities, Meedco’s 
leadership and the Egyptian government initiated a 
number of managerial and operational reforms in 
Meedco. The reform initiatives aimed to improve the 
financial and non-financial performance of Meedco as 
expected by the Egyptian government in its 
cooperation framework with the EU commission. The 
military manner of implementing the reforms in 
Meedco succeeded in implementing product 
diversification strategies, geographical market 
segmentation and an integrated ERP system in 
different branches of Meedco across the country. 
Many of Meedco’s employees resisted implementing 
ERP, however, because they had no financial incentive 
or managerial pressure to do so.  
The findings of our case study show the 
relevance of using the institutional theoretical 
framework suggested by Dillard et al. (2004) in 
analysing relationships between macro political 
ideologies, such as military dictatorship, 
nationalisation, privatisation and re-privatisation, 
and micro organisational change policies involving 
politicians and private sector investors at 
organisational field levels, such as, Philips Ltd, the 
EEHC and the Egyptian Ministry of Electricity and 
Energy. The findings contribute to recent studies of 
privatisation and management accounting change in 
public sector organisations (Agrizzia and Sian, 2015; 
Chang, 2015; Robert and Warwick, 2015; Sharma and 
Lawrence, 2015; Noguchi et al., 2015) and add a re-
privatisation perspective. The main theoretical 
contribution is to show the relevance of cost 
management strategies when used to achieve a 
business goal, such as organisational performance, in 
a public sector organisation dominated by political 
power and military ideology at different hierarchical 
levels. 
The implication is that practitioners and 
policymakers should avoid using the macro-political 
power and policies of the state arbitrarily when 
implementing management accounting strategies to 
achieve a business goal, such as in the case of the re-
privatisation of Meedco. As in any other case study, 
however, the findings of this study do not necessarily 
apply to any organisation other than the organisation 
analysed. Further research is needed to analyse inter-
organisational strategies to implement ERP in all 
branches of Meedco and to use ERP performance 
metrics in designing managerial compensation 
packages at different hierarchical levels. 
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